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Abstract 
   The large weight of public financial institutions is often identified as one of the characteristics of the 
Japanese financial system. It is believed that reform of the private financial sector is not enough to revitalize 
the Japanese financial system, but reform of the public financial sector is crucial. There are various opinions 
concerning ideal public financial institutions, and heated debate continues. We would like to raise attention 
to the point that much discourse is based on the prerequisite that public financial sector is still increasing 
(i.e., the ballooning theory). However, only a small number of arguments present grounds for the prerequisite, 
and even in the case of those based on statistical analyses, such analyses are not rigorously verified. Under 
these circumstances, the first purpose of this paper is to reverify the ballooning theory of public financial 
sector which is used as a prerequisite for much of the discourse. 
      Of course, although the ballooning theory may be overstated, private financial institutions’ cries for help 
strongly suggest that they are being squeezed by public institutions. The reason why public financial 
institutions that should be tightly regulated have such great power and oppress the private sector, which has 
been significantly deregulated in recent years, is often thought to be because so many privileges are given to 
public financial institutions as government enterprises (the privileged government enterprise theory). We 
agree that government enterprises have privileges, but if these are small, it is difficult to say that they are the 
main cause of the competitive dominance of government enterprises. The size of the privileges must be 
quantified to assess the privileged government enterprise theory. This is the second purpose of this paper.   
      The following are the major conclusions of this paper. Concerning the public financial sector ballooning 
theory, various indexes prove that public financial activities had increased in share by around 1998, so from 
this aspect the ballooning theory is correct. However, this situation changed and since 1998 public financial 34  N. Yamori, N. Nishigaki / Public Policy Review 
activities have either remained at the same level or have tended to decline. Further attention should be paid to 
the fact that when examining the relative size of public financial activities, the result varies significantly 
depending on how the area of interest is set. For instance, if finance is viewed as a risk bearing mechanism 
rather than a flow of funds, public involvement in finance in the U.S. may be greater than in Japan. 
      Concerning the privileged government enterprise theory, it is true that Japan Post has privileges (e.g., the 
exemption of taxes as current expenses), but the estimate of ¥4.6 trillion over ten years by the Japanese 
Bankers Association is considered to be excessive. It may be judged that most of the privileges of the 
government enterprise have been eliminated during the establishment process of Japan Post and the 
conditions of government enterprise for competition are almost equalized with the private sector, On the 
other hand, government enterprise may become unable to bear the burden caused by restrictions imposed on 
them any longer (particularly the obligation of maintaining offices in remote areas), so how Japan Post can 
bear the burden must be considered. 
      This paper is organized as follows. Section II examines the ballooning of the public financial sector, which 
is treated as the starting point of the debate concerning the reform of public financial system in Japan. Section 
III reverifies the privileges enjoyed by government enterprises. Section IV presents the conclusions of this 
paper. 
 
                                                         
 
I.  Introduction  
 
   The significant influence of the public financial system is frequently pointed out as a 
characteristic of the Japanese financial system. The prevailing opinion is that, in order to revive the 
financial system, reform of the public financial sector as well as the private financial sector is 
essential. In other words, reconsidering the role of the government as a financial intermediation 
service provider has become increasingly necessary. In fact, reform of public financial system has 
been discussed since the 1980s, and its likelihood has gradually increased during the long-term 
economic stagnation and growing financial uneasiness after the collapse of the financial bubble.   
   The most significant movement regarding the public financial system since the 1990s is the 
crucial reform in the government’s investment and loan program enacted in April 2001. As a result, 
1) full abolition of the deposit requirement system for postal savings/pension reserves and 
discretionary management; 2) adoption of market principles for government investment and loan 
institutions’ fund procurement (issuance of investment-and-loan institutions bonds); and 3) 
introduction of the policy cost analysis, were implemented. In addition, it should be noted that 
responsibility for the postal service was transferred from the Ministry of Posts and 
Telecommunications to the Postal Services Agency, and then again to the Japan Post in April 2003.   
      As just described, it is true that the public financial system which has continued for more than 
50 years after the Second World War faced a drastic change, and whether the public financial   N. Yamori, N. Nishigaki / Public Policy Review  35 
sector ought to continue is still actively debated. In other words, there is a considerable difference 
in opinion regarding further reforms, including the opinion that the postal service privatization, 
and abolition and integration of government-affiliated financial corporations, should proceed, that 
the present status quo should be maintained, and that the types of services and the lines of 
business should be diversified without changing the corporate structure. In this regard, it should 
be recognized that the current ballooning of the public financial system is often used as a 
legitimate premise for discussion. However, it is surprising that an appropriate basis for such an 
argument is rarely shown. Even when some statistics are given, it appears that the validity of such 
statistics is not sufficiently examined. Therefore, the first objective of this article is to re-examine 
the public financial sector ballooning theory.   
      Of course, even if reality is somewhat exaggerated in the ballooning theory, from the outcry of 
private-sector financial institutions, there is no doubt that private corporations are under pressure. 
Generally speaking, government enterprises are inefficient. For example, of the three branches of 
Japan Post’s services, the postal service had an uphill battle against private trucking service 
providers. However, in the financial services, the public financial sector matched or got the better 
of private operators, and as a result, the private-sector financial institutions continue to voice their 
complaints that “private sector corporations are under pressure”. The regulatory framework for the 
public financial sector hasn’t changed much, but the scope of services provided by the 
private-sector financial institutions has expanded considerably, and they are now in a position to 
adopt a new corporate structure such as a financial holding company. Therefore, the competitive 
advantage of the private-sector financial institutions must have increased in recent years. 
Nevertheless, the public financial sector (which should be under rigid control) still has the 
dominant power, and squeezes the private-sector corporations.   
   In the eyes of private-sector financial institutions, the reason is simple: because enormous 
“privileges for government enterprises” are given to the public financial sector (the privileged 
government enterprise theory). Thus, privatization to equalize competitive conditions for both the 
private and public sectors or, even without privatization, a reduction or abolition of government 
enterprise privileges has been sought. However, we would like to examine whether the privileges 
for government enterprises give the public financial sector the competitive advantage. The authors 
do not deny that there are privileges for government enterprises, but if such privileges are small in 
terms of the amount, it is difficult to believe that such privileges bring meaningful competitive 
advantage. Therefore, in order to evaluate the privileged government enterprise theory, we first 
need to know the size of the privileges for government enterprises. The second purpose of this 
article is to verify the validity of the estimate provided by the Japanese Bankers Association shown 
in Section III, which is often quoted.   
      This paper is divided as follows: Section II examines public financial sector ballooning, which 
is regarded as the premise for discussion on the public financial system reform in Japan. Section III 
investigates “privileges for government enterprises”. Section IV is the conclusion.   36  N. Yamori, N. Nishigaki / Public Policy Review 
II.    Does the Public Financial Sector Carry a Significant Weight?     
 
   The reformers that insist on the need for public financial system reforms may feel that the 
resource allocation function of Japanese financial markets is distorted as a result of public financial 
sector ballooning. For this discussion to have validity, it is necessary to show that public financial 
sector has actually ballooned and then accurately measure the size of the distortion of the resource 
allocation that the public financial sector causes. This paper examines the public financial sector 
ballooning theory, as mentioned in the Introduction, because the theory does not seem to be 
properly evaluated although it is used as a legitimate premise for the public financial system 
reform discussion.   
 
II. 1.    Change in the Size/Weight of the Public Financial Sector in Japan 
 
   First, the transition in the scale of Japanese public financial sector will be considered. (C) in 
Table 1 shows the ratio of the outstanding assets in the private non-financial sector held by public 
financial institutions (B) to the outstanding liabilities of the private non-financial sector (A). Here, 
the public financial sector includes government-affiliated financial institutions which directly 
compete against private corporations, and postal savings’ depositor loans. According to Table 1, 
there is an obvious overall increase in the share of financial activities by the public financial sector 
in Japan since the beginning of the 1990s. This was directly caused by the fact that the 
stabilization function allegedly inherent to government investments and loans were actively used 
during the depression that followed the collapse of the economic bubble. However, no significant 
changes have been seen during the last 5 years (from 1998 to 2002), rather there has been a 
decrease in this amount.   
   The middle column of Table 1 considers the amount of shareholdings and capital investments. 
Since assets of public institutions are limited to the balance of money loans (including bond holding), 
the weight of public financial system (C') is relatively greater when we exclude the amount of 
shareholdings and capital investments. While various investments and loans are available to 
private-sector financial institutions including banks, since business lines are restricted to financing 
loans and limited investments, the government-affiliated financial institutions have greater weight in 
the loan business. Therefore, when we focus only on the loan business, the ”pressure” is emphasized. 
In addition, the weight naturally increases when Government special account loans to the public 
non-financial sector (government corporations and public business organizations, such as Japan 
Highway Public Corporation) are included. This is shown as (C") in Table 1.
1) 
           
1)    For reference, the above figures do not include outstanding debt guarantees by credit guarantee associations or other 
government agencies. According to the survey by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications (2003), the 
guaranteed amount as of the end FY2001 is JPY 37,757.3 billion (mostly by the Credit Guarantee Associations). By adding 
this amount to (B"), the share of public financial sector as of the end-FY2001 increases from 18.1％  as shown in (C”) to 
21.0%.   N. Yamori, N. Nishigaki / Public Policy Review  37 
Table 1    Change in the Size/Share of the Public Financial Sector in Japan 
Fiscal  Year  1990 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Outstanding liabilities of the private 
non-financial sector: (A) 
1630.4 1702.5 1518.2 1726.1 1588.8  1586.0  1459.1 
Outstanding assets in the private non-financial 
sector held by the public financial sector (postal 
savings + government-affiliated financial 
institutions) : (B) 
113.2 167.6 194.4 196.4 195.7  190.0  181.3 
(B) / (A) × 100: (C)  6.9 9.8 12.8 11.4 12.3  12.0  12.4 
(A) less outstanding shares / investments: (A')  1199.3 1296.8 1221.1 1192.8 1169.6  1217.7  1085.1 
(B) less outstanding shares / investments: (B')  111.9 163.2 188.5 190.7 189.9  185.2  177.0 
(B') / (A') × 100: (C')  9.3 12.6 15.4 16.0 16.2  15.2  16.3 
(A') plus outstanding borrowings by the public 
non-financial sector: (A") 
1256.3 1358.8 1275.4 1251.0 1236.8  1286.9  1156.2 
(B') plus outstanding special account loans to 
the public non-financial sector : (B") 
148.0 202.0 225.4 230.7 233.6  232.3  227.1 
(B") / (A") × 100: (C")  11.8 14.9 17.7 18.4 18.9  18.1  19.6 
Note: The outstanding balance is in JPY in trillions; ratios are in %. Figures are provided by the ”FY2002 National 
Economic Accounting”, Cabinet Office.   
 
II. 2.    The Share of the Postal Savings   
 
      Next, the size and the share of the Postal Savings as a funding body for public financial system 
will be considered.   
      Table 2 follows the changes in the share of postal savings since 1990 in 2-year cycles. It can be 
seen that Japanese households strengthened the tendency toward risk-free assets, including bank 
deposits and postal savings, after the collapse of the economic bubble (A). The ratio of postal 
savings (B) to “deposits and savings” showed limited growth during the high-interest period 
during the collapse of the bubble economy, gradually increasing until 1998 and then rapidly falling.   
   This data suggests that the postal savings increased its share of the Japanese households’ 
financial assets primarily due to a reflection of the growing tendency of the Japanese public toward 
safer assets. The percentage of safe assets held by Japanese households (excluding NPOs for 
statistical reasons) is shown in Table 3. Here, “government-related assets” are government bonds, 
investment and loan bonds, municipal bonds, bonds issued by government-affiliated agencies and 
postal savings. “Risk-free assets” are government-related assets plus cash and bank deposits 
except for foreign currency deposits.
2) 
           
2)    Life insurance policies are excluded. 38  N. Yamori, N. Nishigaki / Public Policy Review 
   T h e  r a t i o  o f  g o v e r n m e n t -related assets to risk free assets, as shown in (C) at the bottom of 
Table 3, should be noted. It is true that the ratio of government-related assets, including postal 
savings, to total assets is higher in Japan than in the United States. However, in terms of risk-free 
assets, government-related assets do not hold larger shares in Japan than they have in the United 
States. The fact that postal savings absorb a huge percentage of household financial assets in Japan 
is reflected only by the heavy weight of safe assets (i.e., deposits and savings) in Japanese 
households’ portfolios.   
 
Table 2    Change in the share of Postal Savings in the Household Sector 
Fiscal Year  1990  1992  1994  1996  1998  2000  2002 
Financial assets (JPY in trillions)  1034.8  1098.4 1195.7 1290 1343.7 1423.5  1368.7 
Deposits & savings (JPY in trillions)  463.7  521.9 580 633.9 693.6 717.8  734.9 
The ratio of deposits and savings to 
household financial assets (%) (A)  44.8  47.8 48.5 49.1 51.6 50.4  53.7 
Postal savings (JPY in trillions)  135.3  169.5 196.9 224.3 251.8 248.9  231.3 
The ratio of postal savings to household 
financial assets (%) (B)  13.1  15.4 16.5 17.4 18.7 17.5  16.9 
The ratio of postal savings to deposits & 
savings (%) (C)  29.2  32.5 33.9 35.4 36.3 34.7  31.5 
Note: Source: Material provided by the Central Council for Financial Services Information 
 
Table 3    Condition of Personal Financial Assets in Japan 
Fiscal  Year  1990 1995 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Financial assets  1034.8  1272.7 1343.7 1425.2 1423.5 1402.1  1368.7 
Risk-free assets  489.6  637.6 730.9 750.1 759.7 775.5  772.8 
The ratio of risk-free assets (excluding 
insurance policies) to financial assets: (A)  47.3  50.1 54.4 52.6 53.4 55.3  56.5 
Government-related assets  144.5  221.9 260.8 267.5 260.9 252.1  246.2 
The ratio of government-related assets to 
household financial assets: (B)  14.0  17.4 19.4 18.8 18.3 18.0  18.0 
The ratio of government-related assets to 
risk-free assets:(C)  29.5  34.8 35.7 35.7 34.3 32.5  31.9 
Note  1 : figures are provided by the ”Fund Flow Account”, Bank of Japan. Outstanding balances are in JPY in trillions; 
ratios are in %. 
2: government-related assets represent governmental bonds, investment-and-loan bonds, municipal bonds, bonds 
issued by government-affiliated agencies and postal savings, excluding postal life insurance policies.   
3: “risk-free assets” represent the above assets plus cash and deposits except for foreign currency deposits, excluding 
life insurance policies.     N. Yamori, N. Nishigaki / Public Policy Review  39 
II.  3.  Summary 
 
      The greater weight gained by the public financial sector in Japan in the mid 1990’s in terms of 
asset management and funding could be verified. However, in order to conclude that the public 
financial system has more weight in Japan than in other countries, we need further detailed 
examination. For instance, if ”financial activity” is viewed as a risk sharing, rather than a flow of 
funds, issuance of government-guaranteed securities should also be considered as government 
financial activities. If so, in the United States where the role of the public financial system is 
allegedly smaller than in Japan, the weight of public financial sector would be greater than in 
Japan due to the important roles played by Government Sponsored Enterprises (GSEs) and 
Federally Related Mortgage Pools (FRMPs).
3) 
      Therefore, while it is true that the weight of direct financing by the public financial sector is 
more significant in Japan than in other countries, this cannot serve as a basis of argument that the 
public sector’s financial activities should be reduced. If the United States is a model to be followed, 
it should be concluded that a re-evaluation of the method of public financial activity (from direct 
financing to credit enhancement) should be taken.
4) Furthermore, the ballooning theory does not 
always support management structure reform (such as privatization). For instance, in the United 
Kingdom and Germany, the scope of business is expanded considerably after the incorporation of 
the postal service. It should also be noted that, in the United States and European countries, the 
public financial system reform was promoted in order to improve the effectiveness of public fund 
management, not to reduce the amount or the scope of its business in order to relieve pressure on 
private companies.   
 
III.    Do Government Enterprises Have Significant Privileges?   
 
III. 1.    Estimate of the Privileges for Government Enterprises 
 
   The Japanese Bankers Association (2002) estimated that the ”privileges for government 
enterprises” of the postal savings business at JPY612.5 billion (FY2001).
5) Specifically, the 
breakdown of the estimation is as follows: ”taxes as ordinary expenses” (enterprise taxes, fixed 
           
3)    In addition, please note that this article uses figures from the balance sheet to examine the public financial sector’s 
share (like precedent studies). In order to avoid equity capital requirement, derivatives and other off-balance transactions 
have been actively used by private-sector financial institutions. If calculation of the public financial sector’s share includes 
the figures of off-balance transactions, the share of the public sector would be significantly smaller than that of this article.   
4)    In fact, the Government Housing Loan Corporation has shifted its focus from direct financing to credit enhancement 
service .   
5)    This article does not consider the Postal Life Insurance business. According to the estimation by the Life Insurance 
Association (2002), the amount of tax exemption for the Postal Insurance Service (accumulated amount over 10 years, from 
FY1991 to 2000) is as follows: business taxes- JPY1,198.7 billion, corporate and resident taxes- JPY1,949.6 billion and JPY 
3,148.3 billion in total. Furthermore, the Association notes that it did not pay the contribution to the Policyholders 
Protection Corporation (for FY1998 to FY2000) worth JPY53.6 billion.   40  N. Yamori, N. Nishigaki / Public Policy Review 
asset taxes, and stamp duties)- JPY 130.6 billion, deposit insurance premiums- JPY 209.9 billion, 
interest from investments in the amount equivalent to the reserve deposits- JPY 38.7 billion, and 
corporation and resident taxes- JPY233.2 billion. The amount accumulated over the last 10 years is 
JPY4,646.3 billion (see Table 4). In this Section, the Japanese Bankers Association’s estimation of 
the ”privileges for government enterprises” is examined.   
 
Table 4        Privileges of the Postal Savings as Government Enterprise (hundred millions yen)     
FY  1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
Taxes as ordinary expenses  1,461  1,269  1,425 1,863 1,219 1,701 1,337 1,285  1,096  1,306 
Deposit insurance premiums  187  204  220 1,660 1,793 1,889 2,021 2,122  2,184  2,099 
Interest from investment in 
the amount equal to deposit 
1,024  920  1,029 847 847 698 514 607  605  387 
Corporate and resident taxes 0  0  0 3,021 4,540 750 0 0  0  2,332 
Government enterprise 
privileges (Total) 
2,671  2,393  2,675 7,391 8,399 5,039 3,872 4,014  3,885  6,125 
Accumulated amount of the 
privileges 
  5,065  7,739 15,130 23,530 28,568 32,440 36,454  40,339  46,463 
Outstanding postal savings 
(JPY in trillions) 
170  184  198 213 225 241 253 260  250  239 
Interest advantages (%)  0.16  0.13  0.14 0.35 0.37 0.21 0.15 0.15  0.16  0.26 
Source: the Japanese Bankers Association (2002); outstanding postal savings is quoted from material disclosed by the 
Postal Savings. Interest advantages (=government enterprise privileges/outstanding postal savings) are calculated 
by the authors. 
 
III. 2.    Interest from the Amount Equal to Deposit Reserves   
 
      First, the interest from the amount equal to deposit reserves was examined. To do so, we need to examine 
an estimate of the amount of deposit reserves required if the Postal Savings joined the deposit reserve 
requirement system, and then at what interest rate the Postal Savings could have invested the funds.     
   The average effective reserve requirement ratio for private banks’ deposits (excluding foreign 
currency and nonresident yen deposits) was 0.64% in March 2002. By applying this percentage, as 
the outstanding postal savings stands at JPY 239 trillion, the amount required for deposit reserves 
is calculated as JPY 1.53 trillion. Since the coupon for a 10-year government bond upon issuance is 
1.4%(March 2002), using this interest rate, the amount of interest from investments is JPY 21.4 
billion.  
   On the other hand, if the deposit reserve requirement ratio for banks is strictly applied, 
because the current deposit reserve requirement ratio is progressive, the applicable ratio would be   N. Yamori, N. Nishigaki / Public Policy Review  41 
very close to the maximum reserve ratio for the enormously large Postal Savings. Accordingly, the 
reserve requirement (for FY2001) is calculated as JPY 2.89 trillion. In this case (assuming an 
interest rate of 1.4%), the interest from an amount equal to the reserve deposits is calculated as 
JPY40.5 billion. Figures as of the end of March 2002 were used for this calculation, but a similar 
result was estimated by JBA.   
   However, it is believed that calculation of interest based on the long-term government bond 
rate leads to overestimation. Although the rate of the 10-year government bond was, as described 
earlier, approximately 1.4%, whether it is appropriate to apply long-term interest rates as the 
opportunity cost for deposit reserves is questionable. Actually, when a shortage of funds in the 
deposit reserve account is feared, banks do not take long-term borrowings but usually take 
advantage of short-term funds in the call market. At such time, the interest rates in the call market 
should be used as the opportunity cost for deposit reserves. In this case, as a result of a so called 
zero interest rate policy, even if the overnight unsecured call rate is applied, the maximum 
opportunity cost would be JPY 350 million.
6) Therefore, even if deposit reserves were required at 
the same level as private banks, assuming a zero interest rate, it is more logical to consider the 
burden of the Postal Savings increasing only by approximately several hundred million yen. 
Therefore, it is clearly an overestimation that the Postal Savings has privileges worth JPY 38.7 
billion as the amount “equal to the interest from investment”.   
   In addition, with the establishment of the Japan Post on April 1, 2003, the Japan Post is now 
required to retain a current deposit account at the Bank of Japan that corresponds to the reserve 
deposit account for private-sector financial institutions, and the contribution rate was determined 
by the Bank of Japan. In practice, the average effective reserve ratio over the last year of the 
private-sector financial institutions is applied.   
   In consideration of the above, there would be hardly any advantage for the Postal Savings in 
terms of deposit reserves under the zero interest rate policy. Moreover, after incorporation, since 
required funds must be deposited in an account at the Bank of Japan under similar rule as that of 
private corporations, the advantages from the deposit reserve would be negligible (although the 
difference in calculation of the reserve ratio remains).   
 
III.  3.  Deposit  Insurance  Premium  
 
      Next, the deposit insurance premium burden was examined. First, the deposit insurance rate, 
0.084%(FY2001), is multiplied by the year-end outstanding postal savings, resulting in JPY 201.6 
billion, which is almost equal to the estimation by JBA. Since the deposit insurance premium 
increased significantly to 0.084% in FY1996 from a previous 0.012%, the effect of the deposit 
insurance premium exemption became significant.   
           
6)    Overnight unsecured and secured call rates were 0.012% and 0.001%, respectively (March 2002). 42  N. Yamori, N. Nishigaki / Public Policy Review 
      However, the size of the privileges from the deposit insurance should be kept in perspective. In 
other words, private-sector financial institutions as a whole, receive funds from the deposit 
insurance scheme on a net basis. By the end of FY2002, since deposit insurance premiums could 
not cover the cost of the disposal of failed financial institutions, JPY10,743 billion was contributed 
(the realization of delivery bonds) from government funds. It is natural for solid financial 
institutions that are well-managed without deposit insurance, to be discontent with the system as 
it appears to only impose a burden. However, as seen from the perspective of private-sector 
financial institutions as a whole, the deposit insurance is not a burden, but is beneficial. And, if 
deposit insurance premiums are set up fairly, for most member financial institutions, the amount 
of insurance premiums paid and received will be equal, so it can be considered that basically no 
cost is incurred.
7) 
      Of course, from the standpoint of periodic income of a single financial institution, there is no 
doubt that a deposit insurance premium is a cost for an improved safety level for deposits. In this 
regard, as postal savings are guaranteed by the government without charge, Postal Savings are 
clearly treated favorably. It is also realized that current insurance rates are unduly high for healthy 
financial institutions which can procure deposits even without the deposit insurance scheme, 
resulting in a disadvantaged competitive position with the Japan Post. From this viewpoint, 
requiring the Japan Post to join the deposit insurance scheme is a way to equalize competitive 
conditions.  
      However, from the standpoint of private banks, stating that the Postal Savings’ should join the 
deposit insurance scheme is not so simple. Since the deposit limit of the Postal Savings is JPY 10 
million, if the Postal Savings fails, such losses by the Postal Savings must be fully assumed by the 
Deposit Insurance Corporation. Given the cases of failed banks in the past, if the Postal Savings 
with savings of JPY 230 trillion (March 2003) fails, the amount the Deposit Insurance Corporation 
must assume is expected to be an amount in the order of several trillion yen.
8) Under the current 
Deposit Insurance Law, disposal must be covered by deposit insurance premiums in principle. But, 
if the Postal Savings fails, it does not seem to be possible for other member financial institutions to 
cover the loss. So, if private institutions demand that the Postal Savings join the deposit insurance 
scheme, but will request the government to cover any loss that may occur in a crunch, 
participation in the deposit insurance scheme by the Postal Savings would actually mean that 
private banks ask being supported by the Postal Savings.   
      It seems more realistic that solid private-sector financial institutions should seek the adoption 
of the risk-based deposit insurance rates in order to restore a competitive advantage over the 
           
7)    Regarding the periods when payoff is frozen, from a depositor’s viewpoint, deposit in the Post Office is protected up to 
JPY10 million (due to the deposit limit) while the deposit in private-sector financial institutions are covered without a 
ceiling. Therefore, private-sector institutions are favored with regards to limits in protection.   
8)    For example, in case of Hokkaido Takushoku Bank’s failure, the amount contributed from the Deposit Insurance 
Corporation was JPY 1,794.7 billion. As of the end March 1997, Hokkaido Takushoku Bank had deposits of JPY 
6,780.7billion. So, a pecuniary gift worth 26% of deposits was made.     N. Yamori, N. Nishigaki / Public Policy Review  43 
Postal Savings. In fact, in the United States, deposit insurance premium rates are zero for the well 
qualified banks.   
      Lastly, it should be pointed out that giant organizations such as the Postal Savings are “too big 
to fail” in the first place. Therefore, it is not realistic to consider deposit insurance as a safety net in 
case the Postal Savings fails. It is important to require conservative asset management to avoid 
failure. Current fund management of the Postal Savings has more restrictions than private 
institutions. Observing these restrictions can be considered as opportunity costs paid in place of a 
deposit insurance premium payment. Deregulation of restrictions on the Postal Savings’ fund 
management should be carefully considered.   
 
III. 4.    Burden of Tax   
 
   The Japanese Bankers Association estimates that, in terms of corporate and resident taxes, 
privileges given to postal savings amount to JPY 233.2 billion (FY2001). This estimate is made on 
the assumption that taxes are imposed on the profits of the Postal Savings. One problem is that the 
profits posted by the Postal Savings differ from the profits on the private corporations’ standards. 
For instance, since retirement allowance liabilities were not realized before the incorporation of 
the Japan Post, expenses were undervalued and profits were overvalued by that amount.   
      To begin with, as the post service operated on the principle of a balanced budget of income and 
expenditure, unlike private companies, it did not aim to make a profit and thus did not need to pay 
corporate and resident taxes imposed on its profits. In consideration of these facts, even if a 
corporate tax was imposed at the same rate as private banks’, there would be almost no tax 
payment. That is, there is no ”government enterprise privilege” in terms of corporate and resident 
taxes. And, though it is rather irregular, in order to support disposal of now-defunct Japanese 
National Railways’ long-term debts, from FY1998 to FY2002, JPY 200 billion (JPY1 trillion in 
total) was exceptionally transferred from a special postal savings account to the general account 
each year, which can be regarded that a special tax was imposed on Postal Savings. According to 
JBA’s estimation, the amount of corporate and business tax exemption for the last 10 years would 
be JPY 1,064.3 billion; however, the special “tax payment” are almost equal to this estimated 
amount.  
      In addition, the Japan Post is required to make payment (when the 4-year medium-term plan 
is completed) if the amount of revenue reserves exceeds the base amount (=JPY 150 billion + 
outstanding savings × 3% - the Japan Post’s capital fund), and 50% of the amount exceeding the 
base amount is to be paid to the State. As the Japan Post’s equity capital is small, payment is not 
expected for some time to come, but once the amount of reserve reaches that base amount, it is 
possible to say that the tax rate may be higher than that of private-sector financial institutions. 
Therefore, it can be concluded that as a result of the incorporation of the Japan Post, any 
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resident taxes.   
   Furthermore, unlike a corporate tax that is imposed on profits, ”taxes as ordinary expenses” 
(e.g., fixed asset taxes, stamp duties, etc) must be paid even if the organization does not operate at 
a profit. According to JBA’s estimation, the amount of exemption is JPY 100 billion every year. 
Exemption of “taxes as ordinary expenses” obviously gives an advantage to the Postal Savings and 
can be recognized as a “government enterprise privilege”. Unfortunately, the authors cannot verify 
the accuracy of the amount calculated.
9)  
      In addition, the Japan Post starts to pay a profit margin (effectively 50% of the fixed asset tax) 
to municipalities where the Japan Post has major fixed assets, such as post office buildings. 
Therefore, exemptions of “taxes as ordinary expenses” are expected to be lower after the 
incorporation of the Japan Post.   
 
III. 5.    Where Did Government Enterprise Privileges Disappear to ?   
 
      If, according to the Japanese Bankers Association estimation, JPY 4.6 trillion was given over 10 
years to the Postal Savings as government enterprise privileges (which is overestimated in the 
authors’ opinion), where did such privileges go? Given the fact that the Postal Savings has no 
shareholders and no investment or loan activities, it could not have been returned to the 
shareholders or borrower companies. So, the privileges must have disappeared due to: 1) expenses 
are relatively high; 2) business expanded beyond the optimal level; or 3) they were reflected on the 
savings’ interest rates.   
      First, if the Post Office’s expenses are relatively high, though this would cause problems for the 
national economy, it could not squeeze the private-sector financial institutions. In fact, the 
expense ratio of the banks is higher than that of the Postal Savings.   
      How about the interest rates for deposits and savings? As the outstanding postal savings is JPY 
239 trillion (March 2002), if ”government enterprise privileges” for FY2001 is returned to 
depositors in the form of the interest rate, it would be 0.26%. Of course, as the interest rates are 
excessively low in recent years, this difference in interest rates may not be marginal. For example, 
in December 2003, the deposit interest rate of fixed-term deposits (with the principal of JPY 3 
million or less) was 0.033% on national average. Adding 0.26% would make a significant difference. 
However, the actual interest rate for Post Office’s time savings is 0.03% and at the same level as 
that at major banks. Therefore, the Post Office does not place private banks under pressure by 
taking advantage of ”government enterprise privileges” in terms of the interest rate.   
   Accordingly, if there is any government enterprise privilege, it must have been spent on the 
expansion of the Postal Savings. For FY2001, the postal savings business’ personnel and 
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non-personnel costs were JPY 651.1 billion and JPY 441 billion in total, respectively.
10) In other 
words, the average government enterprise privileges per year (JPY 465 billion) represented 42.6% 
of the operating expenses. Therefore, if the Postal Savings lost ”government enterprise privileges”, 
the size of the business must be reduced significantly.   
   There are 538 municipalities where there are no private-sector financial institutions (banks 
and credit associations) and 696 municipalities with only one private-sector financial institution 
in 2003. Private-sector financial institutions do not operate offices in these locations because no 
profit can be expected, but even in these areas, there is at least one post office. The fact that 
income and expenditure are balanced, even with government enterprise privileges, suggest that 
part of the government enterprise privileges is spent to cover the operating costs of offices 
in ”loss-making” areas. Calculating the size of “government enterprise restrictions”, such as the 
operation of offices in ”loss-making” areas, in comparison with ”government enterprise privileges” 
is another important issue.   
 
III.  6.  Summary 
 
      It has been concluded that the estimation by JBA that ”government enterprise privileges” given 
to the Postal Savings amount to JPY 4.6 trillion over 10 years is an overestimation, and that it is 
difficult to believe that government enterprise privileges given to the Post Office pose 
disadvantages to private-sector financial institutions. Furthermore, many of these privileges have 
been eliminated as a result of institutional reforms. Therefore, if government enterprise privileges 
had once given advantages to the Post Office, the reversal should occur in the near future.   
   H o w e v e r ,  t h e  f a c t  t h a t  t h e  p o s t a l  s a v i n g s  business has a kind of government enterprise 
privileges is not debated. Actually, exemption of “taxes as ordinary expenses” obviously gives the 
Post Office an advantage. But since ”government enterprise restrictions” are simultaneously 
imposed, ”government enterprise privileges” must be considered on a net basis instead of gross. 
Unfortunately, the size of such privileges and restrictions has yet to be accurately measured. Only 
after this has been done, we can choose the best method in order to achieve policy objectives.   
 
IV.  Conclusion 
 
   In this article, we discussed the public financial sector which plays an important role in 
Japanese financial system from two aspects. First, we discussed whether the Japanese public 
financial sector has ballooned on a global basis. This ballooning theory is the premise for 
arguments regarding public financial system reforms, and as this article suggested, the public 
sector’s share varies widely depending on the definition of the range of public financial activities. 
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For example, if credit enhancement by the government is deemed as a part of financial activities, 
public financial system would have greater weight in the United States than in Japan. In addition, 
it was proven that the ratio of government-related and non-government-related assets to personal 
risk-free assets is almost the same in Japan as that in the United States. Therefore, we can 
conclude that the ratio of government-related assets (including postal savings) to personal 
financial assets is higher in Japan than in the United States because the Japanese households have 
demonstrated a greater tendency toward risk-free assets than U.S. households.   
      Secondly, this article examined whether Japanese private-sector financial institutions are at a 
disadvantage to the Post Office due to the existence of “government enterprise privileges.” It is true 
that government enterprise privileges are given to the Postal Service, but the estimation made by a 
private-s e c t o r  i n s t i t u t i o n  w a s  e x c e s s i v e ,  a n d  a  n u m b e r  o f  p r i v i l e g e s  h a v e  b e e n  l o s t  t h r o u g h  
institutional reforms. On the other hand, a number of government enterprise restrictions (for 
example, maintaining offices in loss-making areas where private banks do not operate) are still 
imposed. If government enterprise privileges are lost, satisfying government enterprise restrictions 
will become impossible. Discussions should be held in preparation for these situations.     N. Yamori, N. Nishigaki / Public Policy Review  47 
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